Halo2 Lookup Protocol
diving into the halo2 lookup protocol.
Last updated
diving into the halo2 lookup protocol.
Last updated
This is a way to prove something about two lists of data (or âcolumnsâ in cryptographic terms) called and . Imagine as a list of items youâre claiming something about, and as a reference list youâre checking against. The goal is to prove that every item in exists somewhere in âin other words, is a subset of . But thereâs more to it: might have extra items not in , and both lists can have repeats. Plus, can either be a fixed list everyone agrees on beforehand or a variable list thatâs part of the proof itself. Letâs unpack this carefully
Two Columns: (A) and (S)
is the âclaimâ columnâthink of it as the list youâre testing.
is the âreferenceâ columnâthe list youâre checking against.
Both have a length of , where is some integer (e.g., if , the length is ). This power-of-two size is common in cryptographic protocols because it aligns with mathematical structures like roots of unity.
The Goal of the Protocol
Prove every cell in (A) is in (S): Every value in must appear at least once in . For example, if , then must include both and somewhere (e.g., works).
Some cells in (S) can not be in (A): (S) can have extra values that donât appear in (A). In the example above, 3 and 4 in (S) arenât in (A), and thatâs fine.
This is a subset relationship , but with a twist: weâre not checking strict equality or exact matchesâjust that (A)âs values are covered by .
Fixed or Variable (S)
Fixed (S): could be a predefined list, like a public database everyone trusts. The protocol proves (A) fits within this known .
Variable (S): could be part of the âtraceâ (a term from zero-knowledge proofs meaning the computationâs record). Here, isnât fixed in advanceâitâs provided by the prover as part of the proof, and its values can vary. This makes the protocol more flexible but also trickier to verify.
Duplicates Allowed
Both and can have repeated values. For instance, and are valid, and the protocol should still work (1 and 2 from (A) are in (S)).
Padding to (2^k)
If (A) or (S) isnât already long, they need to be extended:
(A): Fill it with âsome data from (S)â. If and , it might become by borrowing 3 from .
(S): Fill it with its last value. If , it becomes .
Why ? This matches the size of a mathematical group (like in the protocol process), making polynomial operations easier.
Itâs efficient and secure, using polynomials and permutations (as weâll see in the protocol process).
The flexibility of (S) being fixed or variable is key:
Fixed (S) might be used to prove something against a standard table (e.g., âall my transaction amounts are valid denominationsâ).
Letâs try a small case:
Imagine you have two lists:
This ensures both lists are the right length, but it raises a question weâll revisit later: does padding A with Sâs values weaken the subset proof?
S': Arrange S so that for every new valueâs first appearance in A', S' matches it at the same position. Remaining positions in S' are filled randomly from S. For example:
A' = [1, 2, 4, 4]
S' might be [1, 2, 4, 4] (matching A' where new values start: 1 at position 0, 2 at 1, 4 at 2).
Additionally, A' and S' must satisfy:
For each position (i), either (A'_i = S'_i) or (A'i = A'{i-1}).
This rule ensures A' either follows S' or repeats its previous value, which helps prove that Aâs values are âcoveredâ by S.
The prover computes a polynomial (Z) to tie everything together. Think of (Z) as a running product that accumulates evidence across the rows:
Boundary Conditions: (Z_0 = 1) and (Z_{2^k} = 1).
Recurrence: For (i) from 0 to (2^k - 1), [ Z_{i+1} = Z_i \times \frac{(A_i + \beta)(S_i + \gamma)}{(A'_i + \beta)(S'_i + \gamma)} ] where (\beta) and (\gamma) are random challenges (numbers) chosen by the verifier to prevent cheating.
For our example:
A = [1, 2, 4, 4], S = [3, 4, 4, 4]
A' = [1, 2, 4, 4], S' = [1, 2, 4, 4]
Suppose (\beta = 2), (\gamma = 3):
(Z_0 = 1)
(Z_1 = Z_0 \times \frac{(1+2)(3+3)}{(1+2)(1+3)} = 1 \times \frac{3 \times 6}{3 \times 4} = 1.5)
(Z_2 = Z_1 \times \frac{(2+2)(4+3)}{(2+2)(2+3)} = 1.5 \times \frac{4 \times 7}{4 \times 5} = 2.1)
And so on...
The idea is that if Aâs values are in S, and A' and S' are consistent, (Z) will return to 1 by the end.
The verifier (V) checks two conditions over all points in (H) (i.e., for each position):
[ (A'(X) - S'(X)) \cdot (A'(X) - A'(w^{-1}X)) = 0 ]
This means at every position, either (A'_i = S'_i) or (A'i = A'{i-1}).
In our example, A' = S' = [1, 2, 4, 4], so (A'_i - S'_i = 0), and the condition holds.
[ L_0(X) \cdot (A'(X) - S'(X)) = 0 ]
(L_0(X)) is a Lagrange polynomial thatâs 1 at the first position (X = 1) and 0 elsewhere. This forces (A'_0 = S'_0) (here, 1 = 1).
These ensure A' and S' align as promised.
The verifier also checks (Z) with two equations:
[ Z(wX) \cdot (A'(X) + \beta)(S'(X) + \gamma) - Z(X) \cdot (A(X) + \beta)(S(X) + \gamma) = 0 ]
This confirms the recurrence relation holds across all positions. Itâs the polynomial version of the (Z_{i+1} = Z_i \times ...) rule.
[ L_0(X) \cdot (1 - Z(X)) = 0 ]
At X = 1 (first position), (Z_0 = 1), so (1 - Z_0 = 0). This checks the starting condition.
If both sets of equations (from Steps 4 and 5) hold, the verifier outputs âaccept.â
The magic lies in the interplay:
A' and S' being permutations of A and S, with A' matching S' on first occurrences, suggests all values in A appear in S.
The (Z) polynomial enforces consistency: if A had a value not in S, the prover couldnât construct valid A' and S' permutations without breaking the equations.
The padding and permutation rules aim to ensure Aâs values are âwitnessedâ in S.
You pointed out a flaw: if A = [1, 2] and S = [3, 4], padding A to [1, 2, 4, 4] and S to [3, 4, 4, 4], then setting A' = S' = [1, 2, 4, 4] might pass, even though [1, 2] isnât a subset of [3, 4]. The protocol checks the padded versions, not the originals directly. This is a limitation: it assumes the prover pads honestly, but a dishonest prover could sneak in values. A fix would be to commit to the original S and prove Aâs original values are in it, which Halo2 might do in a broader context (e.g., with additional constraints).
The protocol pads A and S, permutes them into A' and S', computes (Z), and verifies polynomial equations to prove A â S. Itâs elegant but relies on honest padding. For a real system, extra checks would ensure the original subset property holds. What do you thinkâdoes this clarify the process, or is there a specific part youâd like to zoom in on?
The protocol isnât just checking if fits in in a simple wayâitâs doing so in a cryptographic context, likely for a zero-knowledge proof system like Halo2. This means:
The prover (who knows and ) convinces the verifier (who doesnât fully see the lists) that .
Variable (S) might be used in a computation where is generated on the fly (e.g., âmy outputs match some inputs I computedâ).
, so length = .
Original .
Pad to (taking 3 from (S)).
Pad (S) to .
Goal: Prove âs values (1 and 2) are in . Oopsâ2 isnât in (S)! This hints at a potential issue weâll explore later.
A: A list of values we want to check (e.g., ).
S: A reference list (e.g., ).
The goal is to prove that every value in A appears in S (i.e., A is a subset of ), even though might have extra values not in , and both lists can have repeats. The lists might not be long enough, so weâll pad them to a length of (e.g., 4 if ). The protocol uses polynomials and permutations over a mathematical structure called , which is a set of ) elements: , where is a root of unity (think of it as points evenly spaced around a circle in the complex plane).
Since A and S might be shorter than , we need to extend them:
Pad A: Fill it with values from S until it reaches length . For example, if and , with , A becomes (taking from ).
Pad S: Fill it with its last value. So S = becomes .
Now, the prover rearranges and into new lists, and ', with specific rules:
A': Sort A so identical values are adjacent, and different values are ordered randomly. For , A' might be (already sorted, same values together).